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Conceptual Hurdles to the Application of
Atkins v. Virginia
Lois A. WEITHORN*

INTRODUCTION

In its 2002 decision, Atkins v. Virginia, the United States Supreme
Court held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment precludes the execution of "mentally retarded
offender[s]."' Writing for a six-member majority, Justice Stevens
concluded that social attitudes and legal trends had shifted sufficiently in
the thirteen years since the Court upheld such executions in Penry v.
Lynaugh2 to justify a reversal of Penry.3 Indeed, according to Justice
Stevens, during this interval, a social consensus had emerged favoring an
absolute ban on the imposition of the death penalty on "a mentally
retarded criminal." 4 To reach this decision, the Court applied the
standard set forth in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: that
"'evolving standards of decency [marking] the progress of a maturing
society"' inform its determination of whether a particular penalty-such
as a death sentence imposed on a mentally retarded individualconstitutes cruel and unusual punishment.'
In Atkins, the Supreme Court took the unusual step of transforming
a specific clinical diagnosis into the ultimate legal issue by making a
diagnosis of "mental retardation" dispositive of death penalty
ineligibility.' Despite the apparent "bright-line" clarity of an absolute
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; J.D., Stanford
University; Ph.D., Psychology, University of Pittsburgh. I am grateful for the insights and suggestions
provided by colleagues who read and critiqued this article: Kate Bloch, Richard Bonnie, David
Faigman, Stephen Greenspan, John Monahan, Melissa Nelken, Mindy Rosenberg, and Christopher
Slobogin.
I. 536 U.S. 304,321 (2oo2).
2. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).

3. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 3o6-o7,3II-2I.

4. Id. at 3o7.
5. Id. at 311-12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, ioo-o (i958)).
6. Richard J. Bonnie & Katherine Gustafson, The Challengeof Implementing Atkins v. Virginia:
How Legislatures and Courts Can Promote Accurate Assessments and Adjudications of Mental
Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 41 U. RiCH. L. REV. 811, 815 (2007). Alternatively, Bonnie and

Gustafson point out, the Court "might have chosen to embrace a principle of diminished responsibility
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ban on the execution of mentally retarded offenders, the determination
of which offenders fall within the protected group is deceivingly
complex.7 The Court's observation that, "[t]o the extent there is serious
disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded offenders, it is in
determining which offenders are in fact retarded, ' '8 was perhaps even
more prescient than Justice Stevens realized. Much post-Atkins litigation
has involved disputes9 about whether a particular defendant is or is not
"mentally retarded." This result is not surprising in that the Atkins
Court elevated the question of whether a defendant is found to be
"mentally retarded" to the status of a life or death matter.'"
While the spirit of the Court's decision in Atkins is unquestionably
humane and compassionate, the implementation of Atkins raises new
challenges with this singular reliance on clinical judgments about
whether an individual is or is not "mentally retarded." The Court
provided some guidance, however. It cited to two commonly-accepted
definitions of "mental retardation," both of which rely on evaluations of
"intellectual functioning" and "adaptive behavior."" States need not be
bound by these definitions, however. The Court explicitly granted states
discretion to determine precisely how to comply with the constitutional
mandate announced in Atkins.'2 Yet, the meanings of the concepts of
"mental retardation," "intelligence," and "adaptive behavior" are-like
the standards of decency guiding the Court-continually evolving, and
are subjects of ongoing reevaluation and debate among scientists,
theorists, and professionals. Shifts in nomenclature illustrate this
as a constitutional culpability requirement in capital cases," articulating a standard against which the
psychological functioning of individual allegedly "mentally retarded" offenders would be measured on
a case-by-case basis. Id. at 814-15.
7. While the implementation of a "per se rule" excluding offenders from the death penalty on
the basis of an easily-measured variable such as the defendant's age is relatively straightforward, see
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty
on offenders who were under the age of eighteen at the time they committed the crime), applying a
per se death penalty exclusion on the basis of a psychological diagnosis is far more complicated,
Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 6, at 814-15. As Bonnie and Gustafson point out:
Whether an adolescent will be constitutionally eligible for the death penalty is easily
ascertained by looking at the defendant's birth certificate. In contrast, the constitutionality
of a death sentence under Atkins turns exclusively on a clinical diagnosis, thereby
magnifying the importance, and the stakes, of the clinical assessments of mental retardation
and the expert opinions based on those assessments.
Id. at 81 5 .
8. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
9. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 155 P.3d 259, 259 (Cal. 2007); Commonwealth v. Miller,
888 A.2d 624, 629 (Pa. 2005); Exparte Briseno, 135 S.W. 3 d i, i (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Io. See Gerald P. Koocher, IQ Testing: A Matter of Life or Death, 13 ETHICS & BEH. 1, 2 (2003).
iI. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3; see also infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
12. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
13. For a superb examination of current conceptual debates and challenges, see generally
WHAT IS MENTAL RETARDATION? IDEAS FOR AN EVOLVINO DISABILITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Harvey N.
Switzky & Stephen Greenspan eds., 2006) [hereinafter WHAT IS MENTAL RETARDATION?]. See also,
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phenomenon. For example, in 2006 the American Association of Mental
Retardation ("AAMR") changed its name to the American Association
on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities ("AAIDD"), and made
corresponding changes to the names of its journals as well.'4 AAIDD

notes that the new language reflects a critical shift in the perspectives of
researchers, professionals, and others about what is now referred to as
"intellectual disability."' 5 Such shifts are not new:
[T]he historical names used for this disability, such as idiot and

feebleminded....

paint a picture of the view of the disability at a

particular point in time. Names change as perceptions and attitudes
change. For example, the major association that is concerned with
mental retardation was founded in 1878 as the Association of Medical
Officers of American Institutions for Idiotic and Feebleminded
Persons. That name was changed to "American Association for the
Study of the Feebleminded" in 19o6, then to "American Association of
Mental Deficiency (AAMD)" in 1933. In 1987, the name was changed
again to "American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR)."

If "[t]he field of mental retardation is in a period of great flux and

transition"' 7 and notions of what constitutes "mental retardation" are
changing, we must confront the normative question of which
conceptualizations should guide the assessment in Atkins evaluations.
In addition, the last several decades have witnessed bold challenges
to predominant concepts of "intelligence,"' 8 which have important
implications for how practitioners measure intellectual functioning. And,

the concept of "adaptive functioning," the undervalued companion to
"intellectual functioning" in modern definitions of "mental
retardation,"'" is also undergoing reevaluation." Given what is at stake in

Robert L. Schalock et al., The Renaming of Mental Retardation: Understanding the Change to the
Term Intellectual Disability, 45 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES I I6 (2007).
14. Press Release, Am. Ass'n of Mental Retardation, World's Oldest Organization on Intellectual
Disability Has a Progressive New Name (Nov. 2, 2006), http://www.aamr.org/AboutAAIDD/
name-changePRdreen.htm. The announcement of the organization's name change was followed by
accompanying changes in the names of the two journals published by the newly-named American
Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD). See Press Release, Am. Ass'n
on Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities, Mental Retardation Is No More-New Name Is
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (Feb. 20, 2007), http://www.aamr.org/About AAIDD/
MR.name-change.htm.
15. See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
I6. RONALD L. TAYLOR ET AL., MENTAL RETARDATION: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES, CURRENT
PRACTICES, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 36 (2oo5).
I7. See WHAT IS MENTAL RETARDATION?, supra note 13, at xxiv.
18. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF INTELLIGENCE (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 2000); HOWARD GARDNER,
FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES (2d ed. 2004).
19. See infra notes 38-44 and accompanying text (discussing the two predominant definitions of
"mental retardation").
20. For a recent examination of the concept and measurement of "adaptive behavior," see
ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR AND ITS MEASUREMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FIELD OF MENTAL RETARDATION

(Robert L. Schalock & David L. Braddock eds., 1999) [hereinafter ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR].
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Atkins assessments, lawmakers, jurists, practitioners, and others must
confront the question of how to comply responsibly with the Court's
mandate in Atkins in light of the continual evolution of the knowledge,
concepts, and practices relevant to its implementation.
This Article identifies some of the conceptual challenges inherent in
determining who is and who is not "mentally retarded" for the purpose
of applying the U.S. Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia.
In Part I, I examine the Supreme Court's articulation in Atkins of its
rationales for excluding "mentally retarded" persons from the reach of
the death penalty. In Part II, I briefly discuss current notions as well as
some recent reformulations of "mental retardation," "intelligence," and
"adaptive behavior." In Part III, I set forth certain key principles of
psychological assessment and then, more specifically, psycholegal
assessments (i.e., psychological assessments conducted with the purpose
of informing a legal decision), noting the convergence of the more
progressive notions of "mental retardation" and its measurement and
modern principles of psycholegal assessment. In Part IV, I contrast the
approaches of two states-Florida and California-to implementing
Atkins and comment on how each approach fares in light of the
principles guiding the conduct of valid psycholegal assessments. I
conclude that for some defendants-particularly those viewed as "mildly
mentally retarded"-summary scores on traditional measures of
intellectual and adaptive functioning will not constitute the most
meaningful and relevant evidence of intellectual disability for the
purpose of death-penalty exclusion. Some defendants who are
significantly intellectually impaired in ways highlighted by the Atkins
Court will not be identified as "mentally retarded" on the basis of these
scores, and may therefore be sentenced to death. Efforts to develop
more appropriate evaluative approaches are necessary and should be
grounded in modern models of psycholegal assessment, guided by
progressive constructions of concepts of "intelligence," "intellectual
disability," and related psychological variables discussed in this Article.
The development and testing of new measurement tools requires several
years, however. In the meantime, given the limitations of existing
measurement instruments, and in light of the severity and finality of the
death penalty, state policies should err on the side of casting a net that is
too wide rather than one that is too narrow in defining "mental
retardation" for the purpose of Atkins compliance. Recommendations as
to the appropriate criteria are set forth in this Article's conclusion.
I. THE ATKINS COURT ON WHY DEATH IS AN INAPPROPRIATE SENTENCE
FOR "MENTALLY RETARDED" PERSONS

In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens asserted that mentally
retarded defendants who violate the criminal law can be prosecuted,
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convicted, and punished, but that imposition of the death penalty on such
individuals is not constitutionally permissible." The Court noted that
"clinical definitions of mental retardation require not only subaverage
intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills
such as communication, self-care, and self-direction that became
manifest before age 18." 2 It emphasized that:
Mentally retarded persons ....[b]ecause of their impairments ...have
diminished capacities to understand and process information, to
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to
engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the
reactions of others.... [T]here is abundant evidence that they often act
on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in
group settings they are followers rather than leaders. Their deficiencies
do not warrant an exemption from
3 criminal sanctions, but they do

diminish their personal culpability.
Because of these limitations, the Court concluded that execution of
mentally retarded offenders serves neither the retributive nor deterrent
goals of that, most severe, form of punishment. 4 The Court characterized
mentally retarded offenders as "less morally culpable" than other
offenders due to "cognitive and behavioral impairments," and observed
that the same qualities that reduce moral culpability also undercut the
penological goals of the death penalty as a deterrent.2 5 The Court
elaborated that "the diminished ability to understand and process
information, to learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or
to control impulses makes it less likely that [these individuals] can
process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and,
as a result, control their conduct based upon that information. ,6
The Court also identified ways in which the psychological limitations
of persons with mental retardation may call the fairness of the criminal
justice process into question. These individuals may be more likely to
make false confessions, less likely to articulate and prove mitigation, less
able to assist their attorneys, and more likely to make poor witnesses in
their own defense. 7 In summary, the Court concluded:
[B]ecause of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and
control of their impulses, [mentally retarded offenders] do not act with
the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult
criminal conduct. Moreover, their impairments can jeopardize the
reliability and fairness of capital proceedings against mentally retarded

21. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,306 (2001).
22. Id. at 318.
23. Id. (footnotes omitted).
24. Id. at 319-20.
25.

Id.

26. Id. at 320.
27. Id. at 32o-21.
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defendants.
Thus, in justifying its conclusion that mentally retarded offenders
should not be subjected to the death penalty, the Court identified a range
of deficits, limitations, behaviors, and predispositions frequently
associated with this diagnostic category. It expressed concern that these
deficits affect cognitive abilities (e.g., information processing,
comprehension, and abstract and logical reasoning), behavioral controls
(e.g., modulating impulsivity), and social interactions (e.g., social
reasoning and judgment, and susceptibility to social pressure or the
manipulative conduct of others). Furthermore, it expressed additional
concern that these impairments -while not necessarily rendering
mentally retarded defendants incompetent to proceed to trial and
sentencing-may undercut the procedural protections that typically
guard against unfairness to defendants in death penalty cases.
The foregoing suggests that, in the Court's view, the label of "mental
retardation" is a proxy for the increased likelihood that the limitations
cited above will characterize the psychological functioning of particular
defendants. And, if the diagnosis of mental retardation could be reliably
and accurately made with current assessment techniques in the cases of
offenders who commit capital crimes, distinguishing those with the
limitations identified by the Court from those without such limitations,
the implementation of Atkins would be relatively straightforward.
Unfortunately, applying Atkins is far more difficult. The term "mental
retardation" encompasses a large and multifaceted collection of
conditions. Not only are there literally hundreds of potential etiological
bases for what we call "mental retardation," 9 but the nature and severity
of impairment vary dramatically across this diverse category." Most of
those within the mental retardation classification who function highly
enough to engage in criminal activity will fall within the category
referred to as "mild mental retardation."3 ' It is within this subset of those
who might be labeled as "mentally retarded" that diagnosis in the Atkins
context might be most challenging. Depending upon a host of factors that
might cause assessment findings to vary across time, situations, measures,
or examiners, the answer to the question of whether an individual is
28. Id. at 3o6-07.
29. See, e.g., AM.

Ass'N

OF

MENTAL

RETARDATION,

MENTAL

RETARDATION:

DEFINITION,

tbl. 7.3 (9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter 1992 AAMR
Manual] (listing "disorders in which mental retardation may occur").
30. Professor J. David Smith characterizes "the universe of human conditions subsumed under
the term 'mental retardation' [a]s overwhelming," and notes that the term mental retardation
describes people "who are more different than they are alike." J. David Smith, Speaking of Mild
Mental Retardation:It's No Box of Chocolates,or Is It?, 14 EXCEFTiONALTrY I91, 201 (20o6).
31. Stephen Greenspan, Functional Concepts in Mental Retardation: Findingthe Natural Essence
of an Artificial Category, 14 EXCEPTIONALrTY 205, 207 (2006); James R. Patton & Denis W. Keyes,
Death Penalty Issues Following Atkins, 14 EXCEVnONALrrY 237, 237-38 (2oo6).
CLASSIFICATION,

AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 81-91
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"mentally retarded" for the purpose of an Atkins hearing may fluctuate.
This is a troublesome state of affairs when an individual's life hangs in
the balance.
II.
A.

"INTELLIGENCE,"
THE CONCEPTS OF "MENTAL RETARDATION,"
32
"ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR"

AND

CHANGING CONCEPTS OF "MENTAL RETARDATION"

In Atkins, the Court left in the hands of the states the determination
of how to implement the constitutional prohibition against sentencing
"mentally retarded" offenders to death.33 As such, the decision is silent
on the normative question of precisely what criteria and assessment
methods are most appropriate in diagnosing "mental retardation" in the
death penalty context. The Court did, however, tacitly signal its approval
of two sources when introducing the concept of "mental retardation" 3
the 1992 American Association on Mental Retardation's Manual ("1992
AAMR Manual")35 and the 2000 American Psychiatric Association's
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM-IVTR"). 36 The 1992 AAMR Manual definition reads:
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present
functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual

functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or

more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication,
self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction,
health and safety, functional academic, leisure, and work. Mental

retardation manifests before age 18."

The AAMR definition further clarifies that "significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning... is defined as an IQ standard score of
approximately 70 to 75 or below" on one of several standardized and
individually-administered intelligence tests,"' and provides additional

32. It is well beyond the scope of this Article to discuss these complex concepts in a
comprehensive manner. Therefore, my goal here is to raise some of the current conceptual and
practical issues surrounding these terms that have relevance for their application in the context of
Atkins evaluations.
33. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
34. See id. at 308 n.3.
35. 1992 AAMR Manual, supra note 29, at 5.
36. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 49 (4th
ed. text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. A third source influential among practitioners and
researchers, but not mentioned by the Court, is published by the American Psychological
Association's Division of Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (Division 33). MANUAL OF
DIAGNOSIS AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE IN MENTAL RETARDATION 13 (John W. Jacobson & James
Anton Mulick eds., 1996) [hereinafter MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE].
37. 1992 AAMR Manual, supra note 29, at 5.
38. Id. The range of "approximately 70 to 75 or below" is cited to accommodate the "standard
error of measurement," which will be discussed below. See infra note 79.
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guidance for all phases of the assessment.39 The assessment criteria
contained in the DSM-IV-TR are heavily influenced by the AAMR
model and therefore quite similar in most respects. 40
As noted above, however, notions of what constitutes "mental
retardation" have evolved over time.4' Changes in the working definition
of "mental retardation" appeared in the tenth edition of the AAMR
Manual in 2002 ("2002 AAMR Manual"). 42 The new definition reads:
"Mental retardation is a disability characterized by significant limitations
both in intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in
conceptual, social, and practical adaptive skills. This disability originates
before age I8"'43 Many in the field were critical of AAMR's failure to
incorporate more modern paradigms at a time when "[t]he field of
mental retardation is in a period of great flux and transition."'
In response to those critiques, as well as to other factors, the AAMR
initiated a more recent and more dramatic example of the conceptual
evolution: the 2006 change in the name of the American Association of
Mental Retardation to the American Association of Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities.' The AAIDD indicated that the change was
motivated in part to conform with international standards promulgated
by the World Health Organization, and in part to address the pejorative
connotations that the term "mental retardation" has acquired, but also to
reflect a critical shift in philosophy. 46 The change incorporates modern
39. 1992 AAMR Manual, supra note 29, at 5-7, 23-49.
40. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 36, at 48-49. The primary difference in the language of the DSM-IVTR and the 1992 AAMR Manual is that the former indicates that "significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning" is demonstrated by "an IQ of... approximately 70 or below" rather than the 70-75 range
set forth by the latter. See id. at 48; 1992 AAMR Manual supra note 29, at 5.As noted below, this
distinction can have great practical import in the Atkins context. See infra notes 152-59 and
accompanying text (discussing the rigidity with which Florida courts have interpreted a score of 70 as a
fixed cut-off score).
41. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
42. AM. Ass'N OF MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND

SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 8 (Ioth ed. 2002) [hereinafter 2002 AAMR Manual].

43. Id.
44. See WHAT IS MENTAL RETARDATION?, supra note 13, at xxi, xxiv. In the preface to the 2003
edition of this book, reprinted in the revised and updated 2006 edition, the authors note that the book
was written because of the failure of the 2002 AAMR Manual to respond to important input from
researchers and professionals regarding needed changes in the conceptualization of mental
retardation. Id. at xxi-xxv. The various contributions to this edited volume address a range of concerns
about the 1992 and 2002 AAMR Manuals. For additional discussion of the critiques of the 1992
definition and the AAMR response, see, for example, 2002 AAMR Manual, supra note 42, at 19-48;
Stephen Greenspan, What Is Meant by Mental Retardation?, it INT'L REV. PSYCHIATRY 6, 6 (1999);
Stephen Greenspan et al., Everyday Intelligence and Adaptive Behavior: A Theoretical Framework, in
MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE, supra note 36, at 127-35 [hereinafter Greenspan
et al., Everyday Intelligence].
45. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
46. Schalock et al., supra note 13, at 12o. The AAIDD indicated that the new name "covers the
same population of individuals who were diagnosed previously with mental retardation." Id.
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scientific and social conceptualizations of "disability" and "aligns better
with current professional practices that are focused on functional
behaviors and contextual factors."47 Psychologists Stephen Greenspan,
Harvey Switzky, and colleagues have consistently stressed the
importance of focusing on individuals' abilities to function in the realworld contexts they ' confront in "everyday" life when conceptualizing
"mental retardation." SWhile it is not yet clear to what extent the change
in nomenclature will incorporate the contributions of these authors and
others who have been critical of traditional frameworks, the AAIDD
appears to be laying the groundwork to move in that direction. The
following explanation is provided by AAIDD for its embrace of
emerging notions of "disability":
[The] construct of intellectual disability.., has evolved to emphasize
an ecological perspective that focuses on the person-environment
interaction .... The importance of this evolutionary change in the
construct of disability is that intellectual disability is no longer
considered entirely an absolute, invariatetrait of the person. Rather the
social-ecological construct of disability, and intellectual disability...
exemplifies the interaction between the person and...
environment ....
This paradigm shift has significant implications for the application of
Atkins. It focuses attention on the need to examine an individual's
intellectual disability as it manifests within the particular context of
interest and with respect to the functional demands of that person's
social environment.' While persons who are severely disabled
intellectually may demonstrate significant impairments across situations
and settings, the intellectual functioning of persons whose impairments
are less severe-the very persons whose functioning is likely to be at
issue in Atkins-will vary with the demands of particular situations and
with the aspects of functioning that an evaluator measures." Thus, as
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. See, e.g., Greenspan et al., Everyday Intelligence, supra note 44.
49. Schalock et al., supra note 13, at 117 (emphasis added). For further discussion of the socialecological perspective, see generally URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:
EXPERIMENTS BY NATURE AND DESIGN (1979); JAMES GARBARINO, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE SOCIAL
ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 1992).

5o . A humorous illustration of this concept can be found in a scene from the popular 1994 movie
Forrest Gump. In one scene, the movie parodies the military as a setting in which unquestioning
obedience to authority is valued above all. The lead character, Forrest Gump, who is portrayed as
intellectually challenged in some contexts, such as in school, is judged to be intellectually gifted by his
army drill sergeant:
Drill Sergeant: "Gump! What's your sole purpose in this army?"
Forrest Gump: "To do whatever you tell me, Drill Sergeant!"
Drill Sergeant: "Gump! You're a ... genius! This is the most outstanding answer I have
ever heard. You must have [an] I.Q. of 16o. You are... gifted, Private Gump."
FORREST GuMP (Paramount Pictures 1994).
51. Greenspan distinguishes the frameworks most useful in conceptualizing two subgroups within
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emphasized below, how an offender performs on tests that tap more
academic skills, such as knowledge of vocabulary or ability to execute
certain mathematical calculations, may not tell us much about the
attributes cited by the Atkins Court as justifying its differential treatment
of capital offenders who are "mentally retarded" from those who are
not. 2 Precisely how the new model will affect the definition of
"intellectual disability" offered in the next edition of the AAIDD
Manual (formerly the AAMR Manual) is uncertain. 3 The emerging
paradigm in the field now known as the study of "intellectual disability,"
when applied to a legal context as in Atkins assessments, bears much in
common with the models articulated by the most highly-respected
scholars in the field of psycholegal assessment. 4 This convergence of
approaches will be discussed further below.
B.

CONCEPTS OF "INTELLIGENCE"

AND ITS MEASUREMENT

In that current definitions of "mental retardation" reference
"significant limitations in intellectual functioning and in adaptive
behavior, ' ' 16 I will briefly discuss both component concepts. Because the
2002 AAMR Manual and the DSM-IV-TR each require use of
standardized intelligence, or IQ, tests to demonstrate levels of
intellectual functioning, I also comment on the relationship between
various notions of intelligence and what is measured by those tests,
where appropriate.
The question of what the term "intelligence" means has been the
subject of voluminous scientific, professional, and lay commentary. One
of today's most prolific scholars on the subject, psychologist Robert
Sternberg, observes: "Looked at in one way, everyone knows what
intelligence is; looked at in another way, no one does. Put another way,
people all have conceptions -which also are called folk theories or
implicit theories-of intelligence, but no one knows for certain what it

the larger class of persons identified as intellectually disabled:
(a) a smaller, more severely impaired sub-category, most of whose members have a known
biological etiology and where the physical and behavioral signs of impairment are fairly
obvious, and (b) a larger, less impaired sub-category, many of whom do not have clearlyestablished biological etiology and where the physical and behavioral signs of impairment
are more subtle.
Greenspan, supra note 31, at 2o6.
52. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
53. In the first of a series of articles by the AAIDD Committee on Terminology and
Classification, which is responsible for revision of the AAID manual, the Committee implies that the
new model will be influential as it "share[s] ... thoughts and ask[sl for input from the field prior to the
anticipated publication in 2009/2010 of the iIth edition." Schalock et al., supra note 13, at 1I6.
54. See infra notes 140-49.

55. See infra note i5o and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
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actually is." 57 And, indeed, after over 150 years of theory, research, and
assessment practice, there remains a range of expert and lay views as to
what precisely constitutes human "intelligence."
Some of the first discussions about a general "mental faculty"
appeared in the writings of certain philosophers. 8 Among the first
attempts to develop a theory of general intellectual abilities with
corresponding measurement techniques was that of Francis Galton, a
cousin of Charles Darwin, in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
He and other early theorists focused on evaluating "auditory and visual
sensory discrimination abilities as well as reaction times to stimuli and
the ability to exert hand-squeeze pressure," believing that these
capacities were the foundation of higher cognitive abilities." Other
influential thinkers included British psychologist Charles Spearman, who
posited that there was a single general intellectual capacity he referred to
as "g," and that correlational analyses could illuminate the
interrelationships of the different components of this general ability.6 ' In
contrast to this notion of unitary or generalized intellectual abilities,
French psychologist Alfred Binet viewed intelligence as the composite of
multiple complex cognitive functions,"- among them memory, imagery,
imagination, attention, and comprehension." American psychologist
Edward Thorndike characterized intelligence as comprised of three
components: "the ability to understand and manage ideas (abstract
intelligence), concrete objects (mechanical intelligence) and people
(social intelligence).,, 6' Throughout much of the twentieth century,
writers theorized about intelligence, conducted empirical studies,
developed assessment techniques, and challenged each others' points of
view. A 1921 symposium on the definition of intelligence revealed that
there were many views - and much disagreement - among the prominent
thinkers.6 5 Some common themes emerged, however, including the
notion that some core components of intellectual abilities related to: "(I)
problem-solving ability, or adaptability to new situations; (2) the ability
to deal with symbols, concepts, and relationships; and (3) the ability to

57. Robert J. Sternberg, The Concept of Intelligence, in HANDBOOK OF INTELLIGENCE, supra note
18, at 3,3.
58. LEWIS R. AIKEN, ASSESSMENT OF INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING I (2d ed. 1996).

59. Nathan Brody, History of Theories and Measurements of Intelligence, in HANDBOOK OF
INTELLIGENCE, supra note i8, at U6, 16.

6o.
61.
62.
63.
64.
note I8,
65.

Id.
Id. at 17-19.
Id. at I8.
AIKEN, supra note 58, at I I.
John F. Kihlstrom & Nancy Cantor, Social Intelligence, in HANDBOOK OF INTELLIGENCE, supra
at 359, 359.
See AIKEN, supra note 58, at 19-2o; Brody, supra note 59, at 30.
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learn or profit from experience." '
Binet and his colleague Theophile Simon developed a test to identify
school children who were of low intelligence in order to place those
children in separate classes. 6" In 1905, they produced the first formal
intelligence test, which measured many of the types of skills generally
used by children in school, such as tasks of memory, reasoning ability,
and numerical skills. 6 The Binet-Simon test, as it was called, was revised
over the next several years, and ultimately translated into English for use
in the United States.69 Lewis Terman, a Stanford University based
psychologist, continued to revise Binet's test, now known as the
Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale.7' The test is currently in its fifth
edition,7' but its use has waned as the Wechsler family of tests have
surpassed it in popularity.7" David Wechsler created the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale ("WAIS"), the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
Children ("WISC"), and the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of
Intelligence ("WPPSI").73 In developing his tests, he was influenced by
his exposure to the widespread use of group-administered IQ tests used
during World War I to evaluate the suitability of military recruits for
various roles in the service.74 The WAIS is currently in its third 76edition
("WAIS-III"),75 and the WISC is in its fourth edition ("WISC-IV).
Each time a new edition of the Stanford-Binet or the Wechsler
Scales is developed, the administration of the test to a large, and ideally
heterogeneous and representative, sample of individuals is used to
develop norms based on age and/or grade in school. 77 Those norms are

66. AIKEN, supra note 58, at 20.

67. Id.at 12-13.
68. Id.at 13.
69. Id. at 13-16.
70. ANNE ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 238-48 (6th ed. 1988).

71. The current version of the test is described at the website of its publisher. See Riverside
Publishing, Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales (SB5), Fifth Edition, http://www.riverpub.com/products/
sb5/details.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2008); see also GALE H. ROID ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF STANFORDBINET INTELLIGENCE SCALES (SB5) ASSESSMENT (2004).

72. Alan S. Kaufman, Tests of Intelligence, in HANDBOOK OF INTELLIGENCE, supra note 18, at 445,
448.
73. AIKEN, supra note 58, at 19;ANASTASI, supra note 7o,at 248-63.
74. Kaufman, supra note 72, at 446-47.
75. The website of the publisher of WAIS-III, Pearson, offers a description of the test. See
Pearson, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Third Edition (WAIS-III), http://harcourtassessment.
com/HAIWEB/Cultures/en-us/Productdetail.htm?Pid=oI5-8980-727&Mode=summary
(last visited
Apr. 20,2008); see also ALAN S. KAUFMAN ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF WAIS-III ASSESSMENT (1999).

76. The website of the publisher of WISC-IV, Pearson, offers a description of the test. See
Pearson, Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Fourth Edition (WISC-IV), http://harcourt
assessment.com/HAIWEB/Cultures/en-usProductdetail.htm?Pid=o1 5 -89 8o- 7 27 &Mode=summary
(last visited Apr. 20, 2008); see also ALAN S. KAUFMAN ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF WISC-IV ASSESSMENT
(2004).

77. See ANASTASI, supra note 70, at 245-46, 252, 258.
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then used to permit standard score conversion formulas so that any
single test administrator can report the examinee's scores with reference
to the appropriate comparison group. Thus, the Wechsler tests permit
the report of the Full Scale score, as well as the two composite Verbal
and Performance Scale scores, for which the mean is ioo, and the
standard deviation is fifteen. 8 As noted above, the 1992 and 2002
AAMR Manuals and the DSM-IV-TR generally specify a score of
approximately 70 or below to satisfy the "intellectual functioning" prong
of the diagnostic criteria for "mental retardation," which is two standard
deviations below the mean of IO0.7 9 The AAMR Manuals, as noted
above, refer to an IQ score range of approximately 70 to 75 points, in
order to factor in what is referred to as the "standard error of
measurement.'"8
The widespread use of intelligence tests for a range of purposes in
our country has led to criticisms, including the following objections: some
test developers have failed to ground the tests in relevant theory; 8' the
tests focus disproportionately on skills relevant to academic pursuits
(such as verbal, numerical, and spatial abilities) and are poor predictors
of abilities to perform in contexts requiring different skill sets; the tests
disadvantage test-takers from minority groups in society, thus reinforcing
stereotypic biases about intelligence hierarchies among groups within
society;"3 and the tests and the concept of 10 conveys the notion that
intelligence is "highly heritable, and ' therefore
passed on through the
'4
genes from one generation to the next. 8
Recent decades, however, have brought with them new theories of
intelligence and, in some instances, new tests designed to avoid some of
the perceived problems of earlier measures. Sternberg reports the results
of a symposium he co-sponsored in 1986-sixty-five years after the 1921
symposium8, - soliciting the perspectives of expert theorists and
78. Id. The Wechsler tests are comprised of individual subtests, each of which focuses on a more
narrow set of abilities. More recent editions of the tests allow for the calculation of several "index"
scores, based on individuals' performance on particular clusters of subtests. All of these scores are
converted into "standard scores" so that the evaluator can compare the scores to general population
norms. See, e.g., PAUL E. WILLIAMS ET AL., WISC-IV TECHNICAL REPORT#I: THEORETICAL MODEL AND
TEST BLUEPRINT (2003), available at http://harcourtassessment.com/hai/Images/pdf/wisciv/WISCIV
TechReporti.pdf.
79. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
8o. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
81. Kaufman, supra note 72, at 448.
82. See, e.g., Sternberg, supra note 57, at 46.
83. See, e.g., Etienne Benson, Intelligent Intelligence Testing, MONITOR ON PSYCHOLOGY, Feb. 2003,
at 48, available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/febo3/intelligent.html.
84. Robert J. Sternberg & James C. Kaufman, Human Abilities, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 479, 491
(I998) (discussing critiques of the controversial book by RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY,
THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE

85. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.

(1994)).
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researchers in response to the question: What is intelligence?8 The
symposium yielded "roughly two dozen definitions," each different from
the next. 8' Among the "common threads," several definitions focused on
the ability to function in everyday life and to learn.8 Sternberg notes that
the traditional standardized intelligence tests do not evaluate either of
these aspects of human functioning. 9 Sternberg's own theories of
intelligence emphasize analytical, creative, and practical abilities, and
differ substantially from that which is typically measured on standardized
IQ tests.' Psychologist Stephen Greenspan, an expert in the field of
intellectual disabilities, builds on the work of early twentieth century
psychologist Edward Thorndike, as well as Robert Sternberg, and others
in formulating a "tripartite model of adaptive intelligence." 9' He applies
his model to an understanding of the limitations and needs of persons
with intellectual disabilities, and views intelligence as comprised of
conceptual or academic intelligence (the focus of most IQ tests), social
intelligence, and practical intelligence.92
Psychologist Howard Gardner recently published the twentieth
anniversary edition of his popular book, Frames of Mind: The Theory of

Multiple Intelligences.93 A harsh critic of traditional views of intelligence
and its testing as overly narrow, Gardner focuses on individuals' abilities
to resolve genuine problems or difficulties that he or she encounters

and, when appropriate, to create an effective product-and must also
86. WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?: CONTEMPORARY VIEWPOINTS ON ITS NATURE AND DEFINITION, at vii
(Robert J. Sternberg & Douglas K. Detterman eds., 1986). The symposium papers are compiled and
published in this book.
87. Sternberg, supra note 57, at 46.
88. Id.
89. Id.
o
9 .Sternberg & Kaufman, supra note 84, at 494. Sternberg & Kaufman elaborate on the three
components of what they refer to as "successful intelligence":
Analytical abilities are required to analyze and evaluate the options available to oneself in
life. They include things such as identifying the existence of a problem, defining the nature
of the problem, setting up a strategy for solving the problem, and monitoring one's solution
processes.
Creative abilities are required to generate problem-solving options in the first place....
Research shows that these abilities are at least partially distinct from conventional IQ, and
that they are moderately domain-specific, meaning that creativity in one domain (such as
art) does not necessarily imply creativity in another (such as writing).
Practical abilities are required to implement options and to make them work. Practical
abilities are involved when intelligence is applied to real-world contexts. A key aspect of
practical intelligence is the acquisition and use of tacit knowledge, which is knowledge that
is not explicitly taught and that usually is not verbalized. Research shows that tacit
knowledge is acquired through mindful utilization of experience that is relatively domain
specific ....
Id.
9i. Stephen Greenspan, Mental Retardation in the Real World: Why the AAMR Definition Is Not
There Yet, in WHAT IS MENTAL RETARDATION? supra note 13, at 165, 172.
92. Id.
93. GARDNER, supra note I8.
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entail the potential for finding or creating problems-thereby laying
the groundwork for the acquisition of... those intellectual strengths
that prove of some importance within a cultural context.' 4
His view of intelligence is far broader and more differentiated than are
more traditional notions, which focus primarily on verbal (or linguistic)
and mathematical skills. In recent years, psychologist Daniel Goleman
has compiled substantial empirical support for the proposition that there
are facets of intellectual functioning he describes as "emotional
intelligence"95 and "social intelligence," 96 and that capacities in these
areas have significant impact on individuals' real-world functioning.
Other psychologists have proposed new approaches, and some have
developed measures grounded more heavily in theory.'
And what about lay perspectives? The research of Sternberg and his
colleagues reveals that laypersons in the United States generally view
intelligence as comprised of three different factors: verbal abilities,
practical problem-solving abilities, and social competence abilities9 The
commonly-used intelligence tests, however, incorporate measurement of
skills falling within the first category, but not the second or third.
Sternberg has also found cross-cultural differences in prevalent views of
what constitutes intelligence, further underscoring the importance of
looking at intelligence contextually. 99 In other words, the question of an
individual's intelligence may be best answered with reference to the
demands and challenges placed upon him or her in a particular setting.
The particular setting might be defined more globally in terms of wider
societal expectations (hence, cross-cultural differences) or more narrowly
in terms of a particular sphere of functioning within a more
circumscribed context (e.g., "naivet&' and "gullibility" in social
interactions more generally, and in the context of collaborative criminal
94. Id. at 6o-6i. In Frames of Mind, Gardner delineated several different categories of
intelligence, referred to as linguistic, musical, logical-mathematical, spatial, bodily-kinesthetic, and two
personal intelligences. Id. at 73-76. While some of these areas of intellectual functioning-such as
musical intelligence-are unlikely to be relevant to the death penalty context, Gardner's writings
underscore that discussions of intelligence as a single global trait may be inaccurate. Gardner's
writings on the personal intelligences, and particularly interpersonal intelligence (which involves one's
ability to perceive, notice, and make distinctions about the moods, temperaments, motivations, and
intentions of others), id. at 239, are not unrelated to the Court's. See supra note 22 and accompanying
text; see also supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Greenspan's concerns
about the social vulnerability of intellectually disabled individuals). Gardner's notions of intelligence
were updated in 1999. HOWARD GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED: MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 47 (1999).
95. DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: WHY IT CAN MATrER MORE THAN IQ (IOth
anniv. ed. 2005).
96. DANIEL GOLEMAN, SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE NEW SCIENCE OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS (2006).

97. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 72, at 462-70 (discussing the Woodcock Johnson, Kaufman,
and Das-Naglieri assessment tools).

98. Robert J. Sternberg et al., Intelligence, Race, and Genetics, 6o AM. PSYCHOLOGIsT 46, 47 (2OO5).
99. Sternberg & Kaufman, supra note 84, at 481-84.
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offending in particular)." °
Thus, there is a conceptual convergence of sorts with respect to
evolving notions of "mental retardation" and "intelligence" that are
relevant to the application of Atkins. In adopting new terminology and
apparently embracing the social-ecological and functional perspectives,
and modern notions of "disability," AAIDD-the group whose manual
and definition of "mental retardation" is the standard in the field-has
moved closer to some of the more modern theories of intelligence. How
this convergence will express itself when AAIDD publishes the eleventh
edition of its manual in the next few years is not yet known.
C.

CONCEPTS OF "ADAPTIVE FUNCTIONING" AND ITS MEASUREMENT

In the 1992 AAMR Manual, the AAMR defined the second of its
three criteria for the diagnosis of "mental retardation" as the existence,
concurrent with "significantly subaverage intellectual functioning," of
"related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill
areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use,
self-direction, health and safety, functional academic, leisure, and work."'..
The AAMR's rationale for including the adaptive skills criterion is that such
measures provide confirmation of the diagnosis of "mental retardation"
obtained with standardized IQ tests, that is, as a check against measurement
error rather than as a way of measuring aspects of functioning not tapped by
the IQ tests.' 2 In response to criticism that this definition minimized the
importance of adaptive functioning, the AAMR altered the diagnostic
criteria to read: "significant limitations both in intellectual functioning
and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical
adaptive skills.""' This change, according to Stephen Greenspan, misses
the point."4 Greenspan's "tripartite model" of intelligence views
conceptual or academic intelligence, which is what the traditional IQ
tests generally measure, as but one facet of intellectual functioning."
Social intelligence and practical intelligence are two other domains
which, taken together, comprise everyday intelligence, that is, the ability
Ioo. Stephen Greenspan asserts that the crux of the vulnerability of intellectually disabled persons
in the context of capital offending is grounded in the naivet6 and gullibility they bring to social
situations. Stephen Greenspan, Execution Exemption Should Be Based on Actual Vulnerability, Not
Disability Label, 13 ETHICS & BEHAV. 19, 23 (2003); Stephen Greenspan & Harvey N. Switzky, Lessons
from the Atkins Decisionfor the Next AAMR Manual, in WHAT IS MENTAL RETARDATION?, supra note
13, at 281, 300; see also infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
ioi. See 1992 AAMR Manual, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
102. The Manual states: "Evidence of adaptive skill limitations is necessary because [the] impact
on functioning of these limitations must be sufficiently comprehensive to encompass at least two
adaptive skill areas, thus showing a generalized limitation and reducing the possibility of measurement
error." 1992 AAMR Manual, supra note 29, at 6.
103. See 2002 AAMR Manual, supra note 42, at 23.
104. Greenspan, supra note 91, at 177.
105. Id. at 172.
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to apply one's intellectual abilities to real-world settings and problems.""
Thus, according to Greenspan, measurement of adaptive behavior makes
sense only if it is conceptualized as measurement of these two other
domains of intelligence, rather than as an add-on reflecting certain
"skills," that are not identified as part of the complex of intellectual
abilities." Therefore, Greenspan asserts that the 2002 definition "still
views adaptive behavior as something different from intelligence and
thus of less centrality to the diagnosis."' 8
With this controversy in mind, what is meant by the AAMR in its
reference to "adaptive behavior"? Given the array of views on the nature
of "mental retardation" and "intelligence" discussed above, as well as the
controversy introduced in the preceding paragraph, it is probably not
surprising that there is no single, commonly-accepted conceptualization
of "adaptive behavior." "Adaptive behavior" was first included among
the criteria for diagnosing "mental retardation" in the I96i Manual of
the American Association of Mental Deficiency (AAMD),' ° and thus
efforts to define and measure adaptive behavior picked up steam in the
I96Os and thereafter."' One team of writers analogizes the theoretical
and empirical efforts examining the concept of adaptive behavior in the
I98Os and 1990s to scholarly efforts to understand "intelligence" in the
first half of the twentieth century."' Thus, as with our discussions of
concepts of "mental retardation," and "intelligence," this Article's
treatment will barely scratch the surface in representing the breadth and
depth of the scientific and professional literature.
According to the 2002 AAMR Manual: "Adaptive behavior is the
collection of conceptual, social, and practical skills that have been
learned by people in order to function in their everyday lives ....
Various
formulations of conceptual adaptive functioning focus on "ability to solve
abstract 'intellectual' problems and to use and understand symbolic
processes, including language." 3 Attempts to measure these abilities
focus on behavior relating to communication (e.g., expressive and
receptive language skills and nonverbal communication) and academic
io6. Id. at 172-73.
107. Id. at 173-79.
Io8. Id. at 177.
io9. The AAMD was the name of the AAMR prior to its 1987 name change.
Iio. Kazuo Nihira, Adaptive Behavior: A HistoricalOverview, in ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR, supra note

20, at 7, 7. It is noteworthy that Nihira refers to 1959 as the date on which this version of the AAMD
Manual was published. Greenspan, however, indicates that the Manual was published in i96I, and that
while "a preliminary draft of the manual was first published in 1959" and is often cited by authors, that
preliminary draft did not refer to adaptive behavior. Greenspan, supra note 31, at 213.
III. James R. Thompson et al., Adaptive and Maladaptive Behavior: Functional and Structural
Characteristics,in ADATIVE BEHAVIOR, supra note 20, at 15, 16.

112. 2002 AAMR Manual, supra note 42, at 73.
113. Robert L. Schalock, The Merging of Adaptive Behavior and Intelligence: Implications for the
Field of Mental Retardation, in ADAvrVE BEHAVIOR, supra note 20, at 43, 45.
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skills (e.g., reading, writing, and numerical skills, as in handling
money)." 4 Social adaptive functioning involves abilities to "understand
and deal effectively with social and interpersonal objects and events,
including the ability to act wisely in human relations, to exhibit
appropriate social skills, be empathetic and self-reflective, and achieve
desired interpersonal outcomes."" 5 Some of the ways in which the
adaptive behavior scales try to measure such abilities is through
evaluating various facets of individuals' interactions and relationships
with others, their social problem-solving skills, and their responses to
certain social situations. Practicaladaptive functioning involves abilities
to perform tasks of daily living and self-care and vocational activities. "7
Thus, measures would typically evaluate the individual's capacities for
"independent living," as demonstrated by competencies in performing
daily routines such as dressing, personal hygiene, eating, basic
housekeeping, managing in the community (such as taking public
transportation), as well as the skills required by particular vocational or
occupational endeavors." 8 Because it is not possible for an evaluator to
observe a representative-enough spectrum of an individual's functioning
in many of these areas in testing sessions, information is typically gleaned
from those who have observed the individual's behavior in the relevant
settings." 9 Thus, parents and teachers would be the likely sources of
ratings for children. For adults, family members and others who work
closely and spend time with the individual are likely information
providers.
In recent decades, there has been increasing attention paid to the
psychometric properties of various adaptive behavior scales. Although
there are reportedly over 200 scales that seek to measure various aspects
of adaptive behavior, only a few have gained acceptance in the field.'20
While not endorsing one measure of adaptive behavior over another, the
2002 AAMR Manual describes several measures that meet the standards
in the field relative to evidence of reliability and validity 2' and with
sufficient empirical research to establish norms against which individuals'
performance on the measures can be compared. 2 The 2002 AAMR
Manual mentions the following measures as scales that have met these
standards: Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales; the AAMR Adaptive
114.
115.
116.
117.
xi8.

Id. at 51.
Id. at45.
Id. at5i.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 5I.

i19. Sharon A. Borthwick-Duffy, Adaptive Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 279, 286 (John W. Jacobson et al. eds., 2007).
120. 2002 AAMR Manual, supra note 42, at 87.
121. For a discussion of reliability and validity, see infra Part ILI.A and accompanying text.
122. 2002 AAMR Manual, supra note 42. at 87.
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Behavior Scales; the Scales of Independent Behavior (of the WoodcockJohnson Psycho-Educational Battery); the Comprehensive Test of
Adaptive23 Behavior-Revised; and the Adaptive Behavior Assessment
System.'
The concept of adaptive behavior, because it focuses on the
individual's actual functioning in real-world situations, initially appears
to be well-suited to the social-ecological concept of "intellectual
disability" as a relationship between an individual's functioning and the
demands of particular contexts. Unfortunately, according to Greenspan,
developers of the currently available adaptive behavior measures never
adequately articulated "a clear theoretical understanding of the
construct" before the development of measures.'24 Instead, once the tests
were in use, post hoc constructs of adaptive behavior were defined by
looking at what areas the tests covered.' 5 Furthermore, initial tests were
developed by focusing on institutional residents whose functioning was
greatly impaired and for whom mastering the basics of tasks like dressing
and self-feeding is significant." 6 Yet, for individuals with mild "mental
retardation," many of the tasks measured on the scales are not
particularly challenging. By contrast, tasks that require complex
cognitive and social abilities are more difficult for persons with mild
intellectual deficits.
Greenspan postulates that the core limitations and vulnerabilities of
those who are mildly "mentally retarded"-which is the category within
which most Atkins defendants would fall-are not adequately tapped by
modern adaptive behavior measures:
Most of [the challenges faced by those with mild mental retardation]
involve dealing with other people and the games, manipulations, and
deceits that, unfortunately, characterize much of human behavior,
particularly toward people who make easy targets. Thus if there is a
universal quality that all people with mild MR possess and that defines
its natural essence, it is vulnerability to social exploitation owing to an
inability to understand other people, especially
when their motives are
2 7
malevolent but disguised as benevolent.
Greenspan posits that the core deficits that place persons with mild
"mental retardation" at risk in society are "credulity" ("inability to see
through untruthful assertions") and "gullibility" ("ease with which one
can be duped").128 These deficits make such individuals vulnerable to
Id. at 88-9o.
124. Greenspan, supra note 31, at 214; see also Stephen Greenspan, A Contextualist Perspective on
Adaptive Behavior, in ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR, supra note 20, at 64 [hereinafter Greenspan, Contextualist
Perspective].
125. Greenspan, supra note 31, at 214.
123.

126. Id.
127.

Id. at 215.

128. Greenspan, Contextualist Perspective,supra note 124, at 69.
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social exploitation. Greenspan observes that constructs reflecting deficits
in social intelligence are all but absent from existing adaptive behavior
measures. 29 This absence is problematic when one attempts to draw
inferences from scores on these measures to the question of deathpenalty eligibility in the Atkins context.
Patton and Keyes list a range of characteristics that place mildly
mentally retarded individuals at risk as criminal offenders, several of
which reflect limitations in social intelligence: gullibility, acquiescence,
naivet6 or suggestibility, desire to please, and a desire to "pass as
normal."'3 ° Other limitations identified by these authors relate to the
more "conceptual" intellectual realm, such as concrete thinking, memory
issues, and language problems. 3 '
Thus, in the final analysis, despite the intuitive appeal of the idea of
measuring adaptive behavior, particularly within the social-ecological
framework, the existing measurement instruments are inadequate. They
fail to examine several key realms of intellectual functioning in which
mildly intellectually disabled persons are likely to be deficient. In the
Atkins context, the existing measures may have very little utility. Indeed,
if the social-ecological model requires us to examine the individual's
abilities with reference to the demands of the particularsocial context in
which he or she must function, we must then treat all inquiries about
adaptive behavior as requiring us to first specify the nature of the
particular context and situational demands to which the person must
"adapt." In other words, we can't possibly begin to evaluate an
individual's functioning in a given real-world situation without first
identifying the specific cognitive, social, and practical demands that must
be confronted successfully by those in that situation. Arguably, we must
strive for a far more focused and situation-specific mode of assessment in
order to determine whether an individual is truly disabled with reference
to a particular context.
III.
A.

STRIVING FOR VALID ATKINs' EVALUATIONS

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT

Tests, measuring scales, and other psychological assessment
techniques must meet at least two fundamental conditions before they
can be deemed useful:
First, the measuring instrument which is used on a given occasion and
for a given purpose [must be valid. That is, it] must really measure the
trait it is intended to measure. Second, the instrument must give a
reliable measurement, so that we obtain the same result if we
Id. at 67-71; see also Greenspan, supra note 31, at
130. Patton & Keyes, supra note 31, at 241.
131. Id.
129.

215.

APPLYING ATKINS

May 2008]

remeasure the trait under similar conditions ....Data should thus be
dependable from two points of view-they should be meaningful and
32
they should be reproducible.'
The principle that measurement techniques must be both reliable and
valid in order to satisfy the most minimal and basic scientific
requirements is one of the first concepts learned by graduate students in
psychology.
Although issues related to reliability may also affect the usefulness
of Atkins assessments, my focus here is on validity. The most recent
edition of the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing,
prepared by the American Educational Research Association, the
American Psychological Association, and the National Council on
Measurement in Education, refers to validity as:
[T]he degree to which evidence and theory support the interpretations
of test scores entailed by the proposed uses of the tests. Validity is,
therefore, the most fundamental consideration in developing and
evaluating tests. The process of validation involves accumulating
evidence to provide a sound scientific basis for the proposed score
interpretations. It is the interpretations of test scores
required by
33
proposed uses that are evaluated, not the test itself.
In other words, even if a test has been demonstrated to be valid for one
type of use, it may not be valid for a different proposed use. This
principle is central to the issues at stake in Atkins implementation. The
tests that are typically used to measure "mental retardation" have been
used in educational contexts (e.g., to address questions about the
student's academic strengths and limitations and what types of special
educational services must be provided) and eligibility for services and
benefits (e.g., to address whether the individual qualifies for a vocational
training or sheltered-living program, or for social security disability
benefits). These tests were not developed for the purpose of
distinguishing between capital offenders whose deficits in intellectual
functioning render them ineligible for the death penalty and capital
offenders without such deficits. Therefore, use of these measures for that
purpose requires some persuasive evidence of the validity of the test for
that application.
The analysis of the validity of a measure for use in a particular
situation begins with what is referred to as construct validity. One must
carefully articulate the nature and scope of the construct that the
proposed use of a measure is expected to test."M "The detailed
description [of the construct] provides a conceptual framework for the

132. DAVID MAGNUSSON, TEST THEORY 59 (1967) (emphasis added).
133. AM.

EDUC.

RESEARCH

ASS'N

ET AL.,

STANDARDS

FOR

EDUCATIONAL

TESTING 9 (1999) [hereinafter AERA STANDARDS] (emphasis added).

134. Id.
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test, delineating the knowledge, skills, abilities, processes, or
characteristics to be assessed.' 3 5 One form of evidence for validity
focuses on the content of the measure and how that content relates to the
construct of interest. Thus, in the Atkins context, if one accepts Professor
Greenspan's proposition that gullibility and credulity are among the
deficits that place mildly mentally retarded individuals at risk of social
exploitation in collaborative criminal endeavors, the absence of any
content on adaptive behavior scales measuring these constructs is highly
problematic.
Indeed, in the development of valid measures, one must move from
one's theory about the construct of interest to the development of test
items that are expected to tap the overt manifestations of the construct.
Ideally, the theory itself is derived from prior research findings, and the
process of developing test items is guided by the scientific method. In
one of the most influential articles written on the subject of psychological
measurement, Professors Lee Cronbach and Paul Meehl emphasized the
centrality of the scientific method to notions of construct validity.'36 The
teachings of Cronbach and Meehl were recently restated by Professors
Clark and Watson, who observed that construct validity requires the "(a)
articulat[ion of] a set of theoretical concepts and their interrelations, (b)
develop[ment of] ways to measure the hypothetical constructs proposed
by the theory, and (c) empirically testing the hypothesized relations
among constructs with their observable manifestations."'37 Thus, the
process of testing the construct validity of a measure is analogous to the
way in which the scientific method applies theory, hypothesis-testing
through experimentation, and interpretation of findings as means of
confirming or rejecting hypotheses. 8 Psychologist Samuel Messick
states:
This comprehensive view of validity integrates considerations of
content, criteria, and consequences into a construct framework for
empirically testing rational hypotheses about score meaning and utility.
Therefore, it is fundamental that score validation is an empirical
evaluation of the meaning and consequences of measurement. As such,
rational argument to justify
validation combines scientific inquiry with
(or nullify) score interpretation and use. 39'
135. Id.
136. Lee J. Cronbach & Paul E. Meehl, Construct Validity in Psychological Tests, 52
BULL. 281, 291

PSYCHOL.

(1955).

137. Lee Anna Clark & David Watson, Constructing Validity: Basic Issues in Objective Scale
Development, in METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES & STRATEGIES IN CLINICAL RESEARCH 215-17 (Alan E.
Kazdin ed., 2d ed. 1998).
138. For further discussion of Cronbach and Meehl's legacy and subsequent development of
concepts of construct validity, see Gregory T. Smith, On Construct Validity: Issues of Method and
Measurement, 17 PSYCHOL. BULL. 396 (2005).
139. Samuel Messick, Validity of PsychologicalAssessment: Validation of Inferences from Persons'
Responses and Performances as Scientific Inquiry into Score Meaning, 5o AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 741, 742
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The commonly-applied scientific methods relevant to the
development, evaluation, and refining of diagnostic tools require us to
examine the relationship between the real-world phenomena that are the
target of measurement and what we use to try to assess those
phenomena. If the target of measurement is of particular relevance to the
law, perhaps defined by a legal standard, the tasks for theorists,
researchers, and evaluators are to identify the component aspects of
psychological functioning that are relevant to the phenomenon of
interest to the law, and to develop operational definitions of those
components. Because operational definitions translate the construct of
relevance into observable and purportedly-measurable phenomena, they
form the bridge between the constructs of interest to the law and the
psychological methods intended to assess them. The development and
use of those methods in the particular instance should reflect a form of
hypothesis-testing which, in turn, further contributes to our knowledge
about the phenomena that are the subject of evaluation and how to best
measure them.
B.

PRINCIPLES OF "PSYCHOLEGAL ASSESSMENT"

The past thirty years have witnessed a virtual revolution in the ways
in which we think about psychological evaluations in legal contexts.
"Psycholegal assessment" or "forensic psychological assessment" refers
to evaluations of individuals conducted by professionals such as
psychologists, psychiatrists, educational specialists or others, for the
purpose of assisting the courts or other legal actors (e.g., legislators). 40
The theoretical and empirical work in the specialty of psycholegal
assessment grew out of dissatisfaction with the sources of data used by
expert witnesses who testify about their clinical assessments of individual
behavior. The courtroom testimony of many mental health experts failed
(1995). In the death penalty context, it is difficult to apply traditional notions of criterion validity.

Criterion-relevant evidence can be concurrent or predictive. See AERA STANDARDS, supra note 133, at
14-15. Concurrent methods compare the findings of the measure in question with findings obtained by
another test deemed to assess the same construct. Id. If the results of both tests are highly correlated,
that correlation provides support for the validity of the new measure. Predictive methods evaluate the
degree to which the measure in question accurately predicts some future aspect of performance or
functioning. Id. Thus, for example, studies of how well college admission examinations (such as the
SAT) predict grade point averages provide evidence for the validity of the SAT as a test used to
predict success in college. In the Atkins context, however, criterion comparisons are difficult. One
might view the 1992 AAMR Manual's reference to adaptive behavior measures as a check on the
concurrent validity of the IQ scores used to diagnose mental retardation. See supra note 102 and
accompanying text. But, as noted above, it is not clear that either traditional IQ measures or
standardized scales of adaptive behavior tap some of the most central ways in which intellectually
disabled capital defendants might be impaired. Thus, there really are no suitable concurrent measures
or predictive outcomes against which to evaluate any proposed assessment methods.
140. See GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE CouRTs: A HANDBOOK FOR
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 43 (3d ed. 2007); see also KIRK HEILBRUN, PRINCIPLES OF
FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT

3

(2001).
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to focus on the precise question of relevance to the specific legal
inquiry."' Thus, for example, when asked to render an opinion about
whether a particular defendant is competent to stand trial, a professional
might conduct a general evaluation of the defendant's functioning,
including diagnosis of mental disorders and/or limitations of intellectual
abilities with standardized 10 tests. Experts would then make giant
inferential leaps and opine about the defendant's competence to stand
trial or lack thereof.'42 Such evaluations were problematic, however,
because they did not examine the precise aspects of psychological
functioning relevant to the legal inquiry."' Thus, for example, in Dusky v.
United States, the Supreme Court set forth a test of "competency to stand
trial" that requires a defendant to be able to "consult with his attorney
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and to have a
"rational" and "factual understanding of the proceedings against him."'"
A meaningful forensic assessment should attempt to focus more directly
on the facets of the individual's abilities at the core of the legal standard.
While diagnoses of mental disorders or intellectual disabilities might
ultimately help explain why a particular defendant could not understand
the nature of the charges against him or could not communicate
effectively with the lawyer, the diagnoses do not directly inform the
initial question of whether the prongs of the Supreme Court's test are
satisfied.
Psychologist Thomas Grisso, a pioneer in the measurement of
legally-relevant competencies, emphasizes that the observations of, and
data collected by, the forensic evaluator must be logically linked to the
"specific abilities and capacities with which the law is concerned."'45
Consistent with our preceding discussion of validity of assessment
instruments more generally, Grisso asserts that legal competencies are
themselves constructs.'46 Grisso notes that despite "the elusive quality of
legal competence constructs," there are systematic ways to proceed in
attempting to provide assessments relevant in particular legal contexts.'47
And, indeed, in the past several decades, researchers have focused
substantial efforts on elucidating the precise questions about human
functioning and behavior that are of relevance to the law in a range of
contexts. "
141. THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND INSTRUMENTS 12 (2d
ed. 2003).
142. See, e.g., RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN L. GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 69-82 (1980)

(discussing diagnostically-oriented testimony).
143. Id. at 10-43.
144. MELTON ET AL., supra note 140, at 127-28 (citing Dusky v. United States, 352 U.S. 402 (i96o)).

145. GRisso, supra note 141, at 13 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at22.
147. Id. at 23.
148. See generally THOMAS GRISSO & PAUL APPELBAUM, ASSESSING COMPETENCE TO CONSENT TO
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There appears to be a strong convergence of the principles that
guide this functional, contextual approach to psycholegal assessment just
described and the tenets of the social-ecological disability model
discussed in Parts II and III.A of this Article. The work of both groups is
informed by rigorous application of fundamental principles of
psychological assessment. The extension of those fundamental principles
to Atkins assessments mandates a close relationship between the
measures used to evaluate offenders and the underlying constructs that
guided'49 the Court in exempting persons referred to as "mentally
retarded" from the reach of the death penalty. As I hope the prior
analysis demonstrates, it is unlikely that the currently-available measures
used to diagnose "mental retardation" meet these rigorous standards,
particularly in light of the high stakes.
IV. A TALE OF Two JURISDICTIONS: FLORIDA AND CALIFORNIA
The Supreme Courts of Florida and California have each had the
opportunity to consider precisely how to apply the Atkins' mandate. The
statutes of both states are conceptually similar, although Florida's statute
is more specific in delineating what constitutes subaverage general
intellectual functioning (i.e., scores that are two standard deviations
below the mean) and adaptive behavior (i.e., "the effectiveness or degree
with which an individual meets the standards of personal independence
and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and
community.")' 0 The California statute states only that, "[a]s used in this
TREATMENT:

A

GUIDE FOR PHYSICIANS AND OTHER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS

(1998);

THOMAS GRISSO,

FOR JUVENILES' COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL: A GUIDE FOR LEGAL
PROFESSIONALS (2005); GRIsso, supra note 141; THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING JUVENILES' ADJUDICATIVE
COMPETENCE (2005); JOHN MONAHAN ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY OF
CLINICAL

EVALUATIONS

DISORDER AND VIOLENCE (2001); NORMAN G. POYTHRESS, JR. ET AL., ADJUDICATIVE
COMPETENCE: THE MACARTHUR STUDIES (2002); ROESCH & GOLDING,supra note 142; Lois A. Weithorn
MENTAL

& Susan B. Campbell, Children's Capacities to Render Informed Treatment Decisions,53 CHILD DEV.
1589 (1982); Lois A. Weithorn & Thomas Grisso, Psychological Evaluations in Divorce Custody:
Problems, Principles, and Procedures, in PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS:
KNOWLEDGE, ROLES, AND EXPERTISE 157 (Lois A. Weithorn ed., 1987).
149. It is not always clear precisely what psychological constructs guide the Court's (or any other
legal body's) decisions regarding psycholegal phenomena. Perhaps the Court (or legislature) did not
articulate the underlying constructs clearly (or at all). Thus, the process of determining which aspects
of psychological functioning are at the core of the inquiry may require substantial analysis and
inference. In the absence of evidence as to what psychological concepts guided the relevant legal body,
one can look elsewhere for guidance, such as to scholarly or other sources.
150. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(0) (West 2008) reads:
As used in this section, the term "mental retardation" means significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested during the period from conception to age 18. The term "significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning," for the purpose of this section, means performance that is
two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test
specified in the rules of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities. The term "adaptive
behavior," for the purpose of this definition, means the effectiveness or degree with which
an individual meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility
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section, 'mentally retarded' means the condition of significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with
deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested before the age of 18.'' I
The approaches of the two states in implementing these statutes,
however, differ dramatically. In Cherry v. State, the Florida Supreme
Court considered an offender's claim for post-conviction relief under
Atkins. 5 In support of his claim, the defendant's expert witness, Dr.
Bursten, gathered history on the defendant's background, administered
the WAIS-III, and interviewed three people who knew the defendant
before the offense.'53 The defendant had scored as follows on various IQ
tests throughout his life: 71 in 1968, 85 in 1972, 79 in 1976, 86 in T979, 68
in 1987, 72 in 1992, 78 in 1996, and a Full Scale IQ score of 72 when the
WAIS-II was administered by Dr. Bursten in 2005.' Dr. Bursten and a
second defense expert testified that proper interpretation of the WAIS5
score required a consideration of the standard error of measurement. 1
Dr. Bursten stated:
The concept of mental retardation is considered to be a range or band
of scores, not just one score or a specific cutoff for mental retardation.
The idea behind that is there's recognition that no one IQ is exact or
succinct, that there's always some variability and some error built
in ..... The [DSM] guides us to look at IQ scores as being a range
rather than absolute. And, the manual talks about a score from 65, a
band, so to speak, from 65 and6 75-and of course, lower than 65comprising mental retardation.,
The court considered whether the statute creates a "strict cutoff" of
an IQ score at 70 "in order to establish significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning," or whether scores presented by evaluators need
to be interpreted in light of the standard error of measurement.'57 The
court answered the question as follows: "the statute does not use the
word approximate, nor does it reference the [standard error of
measurement]. Thus, the language of the statute and the corresponding
rule are clear. We defer to the plain meaning of the statute."'' 8 The court
thus established a firm and unyielding cutoff of 70 as the score above
which defendant's claims to be mentally retarded would be rejected. As
such, it rejected the recently-obtained score of 72 as indicative of mental
expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community.
151. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376(a) (West 2008).
152. 959 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 2007). The Florida Supreme Court also upheld lower courts' denials of
defendants' petitions for post-conviction relief in Brown v. State, 959 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 2007), and Jones
v. State, 966 So. 2d 319 (2007).
153. Cherry, 959 So. 2d at 711.
154. Id.

155. Id.
156. Id. at 711-2.
157. Id. at 712.

158. Id. at 73.
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retardation.'59
The California Supreme Court's approach is quite different. In re
Hawthorne addressed the same question before the Cherry court: Can
the state adopt an IQ score of 70 as the upper cut-off for a prima facie
showing of mental retardation?'6 Noting legislative silence as to the
appropriateness of any particular numerical cut-off score, recognizing the
problems of measurement error and other factors, the court refrained
from establishing a priori interpretive rules.' 6' In the case before it, the
court upheld the lower court's finding that the defendant was mentally
retarded and therefore not eligible for the death penalty. 62 In addition,
the court in Hawthorne left the door open to more wide-ranging
testimony by experts on the question of mental retardation.
The California Supreme Court's decision in People v. Vidal 6, in 2007
revealed the flexibility of this type of open-ended standard. Multiple sets
of intelligence test scores in Vidal revealed a consistent pattern:
significant discrepancies between the Verbal and Performance Scale
scores on the Wechsler tests.'6 4 The Verbal Scale scores ranged from 59
to 77; the Performance Scale scores ranged from 96 to I26.'65 The Full
Scale scores ranged from 8i to 96.'66 The expert for the defense testified
that, although the defendant's Full Scale IQ scores were above the levels
typically considered to be in the range of mental retardation, his Verbal
Scale scores were quite lOW. 67 The trial court had found convincing the
expert's testimony that the defendant manifested "significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning" because
[h]is "very low scores in terms of verbal I.Q.," even if due to a deficit in
auditory processing rather than to low intellectual functioning "across
the board," demonstrated a significant deficit in his "ability to process
information and handle it adequately and to think logically."... The
court further observed that Verbal IQ was particularly relevant in
applying Atkins because "[w]e are talking about issues of
premeditation, deliberation, appreciation of concepts of wrongful
conduct, ability to think and weigh reasons for and not for doing things
and logic, foresight, and all of those are related to verbal I.Q."
Accepting the existence of the Flynn effect, the court also noted that
"one or two point" gaps between IQ scores and the theoretical cutoff
were not persuasive. Finding Vidal also met the remainder of the
statutory definition of mental retardation, the court ordered the

159. Id. at 714.
r6o. 105 P.3d 552, 557 (Cal. 2005).
I61. Id. at 557-58,
162.

Id. at 559.

63. 155 P.3d 259 (Cal. 2007).
164. Id. at 261.
165. Id.

66. Id.
167. Id.
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prosecution precluded, under section 1376, from seeking the death
penalty."

The contrast of the Florida and California approaches is reminiscent
of the familiar juxtaposition of rules and standards.'6' Each approach, in
the abstract, has features than may be advantageous or problematic,
depending upon the circumstances.' 70 Rigid rules that result in arbitrary
decisions-such as Florida's categorical refusal to consider the standard
error of measurement-promote unfairness and undercut the public's
trust in our system of justice. Yet, unguided discretion, particularly as it
concerns the testimony of expert witnesses, carries its own risks.
Hawthorne may invite substantial inconsistency in application of the
statute from one case to the next, given the breadth of interpretations of
data about which it allows experts to testify.' That said, the substance of
the expert testimony in the Vidal case has greater intuitive appeal, and
seems more consistent with the principles of validity articulated in Part
III above, irrespective of whether it ultimately constituted a correct
interpretation of the test findings. The expert in Vidal not only
acknowledged some of the psychometric limitations of the test
administered, but he also tried to provide a more functionally-oriented
interpretation of the meaning of the test scores in light of the particular
question of relevance to the court. He focused on the specific
psychological capacities which, if impaired, might limit an individual's
ability to make wise choices and refrain from socially harmful conduct.

i68. Id. at 263 (citation omitted).
169. The rules versus standards debate has been the subject of much scholarly commentary. See,
e.g., Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y In (997); Pierre
Schlag, Rules and Standards,33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court
1991 Term: Foreword: The Justicesof Rules and Standards,io6 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
170. For example, Professor Kathleen Sullivan identifies some of the distinguishing features of
rules versus standards:
Rules, once formulated, afford decisionmakers less discretion than do standards ....
(a) Rules.-A legal directive is "rule"-like when it binds a decisionmaker to respond in a
determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering facts. Rules aim to confine the
decisionmaker to facts, leaving irreducibly arbitrary and subjective value choices to be
worked out elsewhere.... A rule necessarily captures the background principle or policy
incompletely and so produces errors of over- or under-inclusiveness. But the rule's force as
a rule is that decisionmakers follow it, even when direct application of the background
principle or policy to the facts would produce a different result.
(b) Standards.-A legal directive is "standard"-like when it tends to collapse
decisionmaking back into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a
fact situation. Standards allow for the decrease of errors of under- and over-inclusiveness by
giving the decisionmaker more discretion than do rules. Standards allow the decisionmaker
to take into account all relevant factors or the totality of the circumstances. Thus, the
application of a standard in one case ties the decisionmaker's hand in the next case less than
does a rule-the more facts one may take into account, the more likely that some of them
will be different the next time.
Sullivan, supra note I69, at 57-59 (footnotes omitted).
171. For a further discussion of Hawthorne, see Christopher Scott Tarbell, Note, Implementing
Atkins: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Hawthorne, 56 HASTNGS L.J. 1249 (2005).
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Given the lack of theoretical and empirical analysis on the validity of
using standardized intelligence tests for Atkins determinations, neither I
nor the expert in Vidal know whether a nuanced interpretation of
particular WISC or WAIS subtest scores might provide more relevant
information than do the Full Scale scores most typically entered into
evidence. Conceptually, an inquiry that focuses on the defendant's
capacities and limitations in those areas of functioning articulated by the
Court in Atkins holds the greatest likelihood of providing meaningful
information about the appropriateness of precluding application of the
death penalty on a case by case basis.
Yet, as the comparison between Florida's and California's use of
standardized IQ tests suggests, there are noteworthy inconsistencies in
the ways in which state courts are using these tests. This result is
disturbing in light of the dramatic real-world consequences of the
application of these tests in the Atkins context. A defendant with Full
Scale IQ scores ranging from 68 to 86 was determined to be eligible for
the death penalty in Florida, while a defendant with Full Scale scores of
8i to 96 was found to be ineligible in California. We do not have
additional information about the adaptive functioning of the two
defendants in question, or about behavior that would have been
indicative of constructs such as social or practical intelligence. Nor do we
have background information about the offenders, about the nature and
circumstances of their offenses, or about other potential indicia of
criminal culpability. Thus, we do not know how the results in these cases
were affected by other information before the trial courts. But, this
cursory jurisdictional comparison suggests troubling disparities in the
ways in which the tests are used.
CONCLUSION

There are many topics relating to Atkins evaluations that this Article
did not address. It did not address the Flynn Effect-a poorlyunderstood phenomenon that causes population IQ scores to rise over
time-and whether and how examiners should "correct" for this effect
when reporting IQ scores in Atkins evaluations.'
It did not address
inflation of 10 scores resulting from the "practice effect," that is, from
repeated administrations of the same IQ test on the same subject.'73 It did

172. See James R. Flynn, Tethering the Elephant: Capital Cases,
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 170 (2oo6); see also Tomoe Kanaya et al., The

IQ, and the Flynn Effect, 12
Flynn Effect and U.S. Policies:
The Impact of Rising IQ Scores on American Society via Mental Retardation Diagnoses, 58 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 778 (2003).
173. See LaJuana Davis, Intelligence Testing and Atkins: Considerationsfor Appellate Courts and
Appellate Lawyers, 5 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 297, 309-10 (203); Julie C. Duvall & Richard J. Morris,
Assessing Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases: Critical Issues for Psychology and Psychological
Practice,37 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 658, 663 (2006).
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not address questions of whether retroactive reports on an individuals'
adaptive behavior from five, ten, fifteen, or twenty years ago constitute
valid data sources for Atkins evaluations, or whether measurement of the
current adaptive behavior of a person who has lived on Death Row for
ten years is at all relevant to questions about that person's level of
adaptive behavior at the time of the offense.'74 This Article did not
address these and many other challenges that confront those who
perform assessments of "mental retardation" in the Atkins context,
because all of those issues relate to the standards and challenges
attending administration and interpretation of the current IQ tests and
adaptive behavior scales in the Atkins context. My focus in this Article,
however, is on the more fundamental question of whether the currently
applied definitions of mental retardation and currently-available
measures of intellectual
and adaptive functioning, are appropriate for the
75
Atkins context.

As this Article demonstrates, the use of IQ or adaptive behavior
scale summary scores in the Atkins context is not supported by theory or
empirical studies. State legislatures and courts-guided to some extent
by the Supreme Court's reference to the AAMR and DSM-IV-TR
definitions in footnote 3 of Atkins'76 -have presumed that the assessment
methods used to evaluate "mental retardation" in educational and social
service settings can be employed in the death penalty context without
modification, reservation, or additional scrutiny. Yet, modern theory and
research in the field of intellectual disability argue against such a
presumption. The social-ecological model of intellectual disability
recognizes that the functioning of intellectually-challenged individuals
will vary from one situation to the next, as environmental demands
interact with each individual's particular skills, abilities, and deficits.
Traditional IQ tests and adaptive behavior scales leave entire domains of
functioning relating to social and practical intellectual skills untapped.
Indeed, many of the manifestations of intellectual disability cited by
Justice Stevens as the basis for the Atkins holding are not tapped by
these measures. Thus, use of summary scores on these traditional
measures to determine whether or not a particular criminal defendant is
174. See Greenspan & Switzky, supra note ioo, at 294-95; see also Bethany Young et al., Four
Practicaland ConceptualAssessment Issues That Evaluators Should Address in Capital Case Mental
Retardation Evaluations,38 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 169, 171, 174-75 (2OO7).
175. Of course, those practitioners performing Atkins evaluations with only the tools presently

available should heed the advice of those writers who have identified the most responsible methods of
administering and interpreting currently available measures. For thoughtful analyses addressing these
issues, see Bonnie & Gustafson, supra note 6; Richard J. Bonnie, The American Psychiatric
Association's Resource Document on Mental Retardation and CapitalSentencing: Implementing Atkins
v. Virginia, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 304 (2004); Duvall & Morris, supra note 173; Young et
al., supra note 174.
176. See, e.g., supra notes 33-39.
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"mentally retarded" for purpose of Atkins will yield an underinclusive
group of excluded defendants.
There is a critical need for research identifying valid assessment
methods for Atkins evaluations. Attempts to develop such methods must
focus first on the specific constructs underlying the Court's concerns in
Atkins, supplemented by relevant theoretical and scientific work relevant
to those constructs, and to modern notions of "intellectual disability."
Such efforts should be informed by: (i) basic psychometric principles,
particularly those addressing the need to demonstrate the validity of
measures with respect to the particular applications or uses of the
measures; (2) modern strategies and models of psycholegal assessment;
and (3) progressive theories defining intellectual disability, intelligence,
and adaptive functioning. Given the dramatic consequences of a finding
of "mental retardation" in the death penalty context, it is of paramount
importance that clinical experts ground their testimony in firm scientific
foundations.
Even if vigorous efforts to develop Atkins-relevant assessment tools
begin today, it is likely that useful measures would not be available to
practitioners for years. Thus, in light of my conclusions, how should
legislatures, courts, lawyers, and clinical experts address the question of
death penalty eligibility under Atkins? Given that the death penalty is
the most severe punishment available in our criminal justice system
and-once carried out-is irrevocable, state policies must err on the side
of casting a net that is too wide rather than one that is too narrow in
defining "mental retardation" for the purpose of death penalty eligibility.
Individuals who score approximately two standard deviations below the
mean on either IQ tests or adaptive behavior scales are likely to manifest
many of the deficits described by the Court in Atkins and should
therefore be exempt from the death penalty's reach. Yet, given the
failure of these scales to evaluate some manifestations of intellectual
disabilities emphasized by the Court and of particular relevance to
criminal offending, below par scores on either of these traditional
measures should be sufficient, but not necessary, for exclusion from the
death penalty. Defendants whose scores on either measure do not make
the "cut" should have the opportunity to demonstrate "mental
retardation" using a combination of data sources, alternative data
sources, and/or alternative interpretation of data,' where the evidence
proffered is: (i) consistent with the Court's concerns in Atkins and (2)
grounded in a functional analysis of a defendant's specific deficits in the
context of the particular capital offense committed. This third manner of
demonstrating "mental retardation" is wholly consistent with modern
177. The challenged testimony in Vidal, see supra notes 163-68, provides an example of an
"alternative interpretations of data."
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theory and research on "mental retardation" (i.e., "intellectual
disability") and, more fundamentally, on the nature and measurement of
the construct of intelligence.

